THE
DIM
HYPOTHESIS

WHY THE LIGHTS OF THE WEST
ARE GOING OUT

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“Integration . . . is the key to man’s consciousness, to his conceptual faculty, to his basic premises, to his life.”

—Ayn Rand

To Ayn Rand,
who made an integrated life possible
FROM THE LATE Renaissance to the mid-eighteenth century, the political system accepted almost universally in the West was absolute monarchy, famously exemplified in the rule of Louis XIV, the Sun King of France. The more philosophical among those regarded as its defenders were Thomas Hobbes and Jean Bodin.

Absolute Monarchy

The basic principle of absolute monarchy is that the king alone is sovereign and thus has unlimited power. Without needing the consent of any other person, he is the legal authority in every matter of state, including but not restricted to taxation, property, infrastructure, economic issues in general, the justice system, the police, the military, and the life or death of any individual or group. As James I of England declared in a speech before Parliament in 1609:

Kings are justly called gods, for that they exercise a manner or resemblance of divine power on earth. . . . They have power to . . . make of their subjects like men at the chess—a pawn to take a bishop or a knight—and to cry up or down any of their subjects, as they do their money.
Such a ruler cannot be challenged by his subjects nor asked to justify his actions; on the contrary, it is the subjects who, being his inferiors, owe an accounting to the king. Like the masses in Plato’s politics, the subjects are regarded as inferior, because, as monarchists put it, they are unable to comprehend “the greatest politic actions and motions of state....” They are mere children in relation to the king, who is their father—a “headless multitude,” helpless by themselves without the only head available. The duty of such uncapatibilized bodies is “to be submissive and obedient....”117

The king’s actions were not intended to be an expression of whim; on the contrary, it was held, they had to be governed by a system of law. But a law in this system is a creation of the king, resting on his unique authority and serving his chosen purpose. Such a creation cannot limit the king, since he always retains the power to annul an offending law. “[T]he Prerogative of a King is to be above all Laws,” concludes Sir Robert Filmer, a defender of the English monarchy. In the words of Edward McNall Burns, a deservedly eminent historian, Louis’ “L’état, c’est moi” “was not just the brazen boast of a tyrant, but came close to expressing the prevailing conception of government—in Continental Europe at least.”118

Since all human powers, in this system, are grants from God, this must be especially true in the case of unlimited power. Thus the standard defense of the system: the divine right of kings. According to this theory, writes Jean Domat, a then famous jurist who championed it, “...it is from Him that all those who govern derive their power and all their authority, and it is God Himself Whom they represent in their functions.”119

In addition to this metaphysical argument, the monarchists offered what they regarded as more specific evidence: God’s own words as recorded in the Bible. Bishop Jacques-Bénigne Bossuet, widely influential at the time, sums up this line of thought in the title of his book Politics Drawn From the Very Words of Holy Scripture. The most common reference cited was Romans 13 (“The authorities that exist have been established by God”). Other popular passages were the story of God awarding Adam supreme dominion over the earth, and the commandment to honor thy father. Filmer adds that there is no text in the Bible giving people the right of self-government. During the seventeenth century, of course, biblical appeals were not often challenged. Thus, according to Cornell philosopher George Sabine, in my opinion one of the best historians of our time, the divine-right theory “was believed with religious intensity by men of all social ranks and all forms of theological belief.”120

The intellectuals defending political absolutism did not base the theory on perceptual data; rather, Sabine writes, “The imposition of divine authority upon the king is essentially miraculous and must be accepted by faith....”—the same faith that grasps the infallibility of divine revelation. The epistemology of political absolutism, in other words, equates fundamental knowledge with a priori truth and inferences therefrom. When men of an empirical bent objected, pointing to observed facts in conflict with the divine-right theory—facts such as the many non-monarchical systems God had allowed in the past or the destructive actions, counter to God’s will, of many past kings—the rationalists were unmoved. The justification of absolute power, they replied, has nothing to do with the facts of history or the practical needs of men; the king’s supremacy rests solely on his transcendent pedigree.121

Living in the early modern period, the absolutists claimed that their ideas, though resting on God, in no way demeaned the material world; on the contrary, they pointed out, the king’s role is precisely to be God’s secular agent, which implies the reality and importance of this world. In contrast to the medieval popes, whose duty had been to prepare men to escape from this life, the king’s duty is to promote men’s success in the world, mainly by expanding his nation’s wealth, trade, and power over competitors. In this way, as has often been noted, absolute monarchy was a usurpation: It was the (partial) wresting of divine right from the Church, its longtime possessor, in order to award it to the palace, a worldly institution. Even some of the kings (though not the public), it seems, viewed the monarchists’ claim of God’s backing as no more than a strategy to reduce the power of the Church by taking over its basic intellectual defense.

The upshot of this struggle was a division of power between the ruler of man’s spiritual life and the ruler of his material life. The Church was the acknowledged authority in matters of faith and morals, and thus was free to criticize a king for any action it deemed counter to God’s word,
but it was not to attempt to enforce its view by physical means. The king was the authority in practical life, with the right to enforce any decrees that practicality, in his opinion, required; this included the right to criticize and even act to oppose the Church, but not ex cathedra—only when, in his view, the religionists were attempting to muscle into his territory, by vetoing a war he favored, for example, or supporting a sect he regarded as traitorous. The king, in short, was a political, but not an ethical authority. Each of the two masters was held in some sort of check by the other. In practice, the division lacked a clearly defined hierarchy and left many issues undefined. The citizens, accordingly, enjoyed substantially more freedom than the term "absolute" monarchy implies; in relation to some twentieth-century regimes, one would have to say incomparably more freedom.

Like Descartes in science, the absolutist movement, though rationalist, was not indifferent to the perceptual. On the contrary, to discover the successful practical policies decreed by God, the king sought out a great deal of empirical information about other monarchs, navies, prices, and the like. Moreover, since the king was not an ethical authority, law-abiding citizens, within limits, had the right to criticize his chosen policies—partly on religious grounds, as ungodly and immoral, but increasingly on empirical grounds, i.e., by citing the observed worldly effects of a king's actions. The absolutist system, in short, did not dismiss percepts any more than it did the world itself; it sought to relate harmoniously the a priori and the observed, or the conceptual and the perceptual. Transcendence gives men their basic framework of values and validates their earthly leader and his mission; observation is what shows whether and how that mission is being carried out.

As with all instances of a mixed mode, there are many variations among absolute monarchies: disputes about the limits of the king's power; where specifically to draw the line between Church and state; what to do when political decisions have ethical implications and vice versa; whether empirical data are merely suggestive or have the power to teach us truth. As we would expect, the disputes arise from a difference in emphasis: a tilt toward Platonic medievalism or toward the new secularism. But within these variations, the same mode rules. The absolute Church was no more, but, despite his claim, only a semi-absolute ruler had taken its place.

In this politics, the worldly One is the king, who is the state uniting the citizens, the Many—and this worldly unity flows ultimately from a transcendent One—the $M_1$ approach.

Capitalism

In the eighteenth century, absolute monarchy was succeeded to varying extents by a new system, one that, in the opinion of James Madison, had "no parallel in the annals of human society." In the nineteenth century, its opponents named the new politics capitalism. Its main intellectual source was a long line of freedom-loving Englishmen stretching from the nobles under King John to the philosopher John Locke, and culminating in the Enlightenment figures who are its best spokesmen, the American founding fathers; these men not only accepted Locke's theory, but created a country based on it.

Throughout history, although the forms of the state have varied widely, its essence has not; the state, to quote from a book of mine, has always been regarded as the ruler of the individual—as a sovereign authority... to which he must submit. The Founding Fathers [by contrast]... started with the premise of the primacy and sovereignty of the individual. The individual... logically precedes the group or the institution of government. Whether or not any social organization exists, each man possesses certain individual rights.

And among these, according to a New Hampshire state document at the time, "are the enjoying and defending life and liberty; acquiring, possessing, and protecting property; and in a word, of seeking and obtaining happiness." These rights were regarded not as a disparate collection, but as a unity expressing a single basic right; in the words of Samuel Adams,
they “are evident branches of, rather than deductions from, the duty of self-preservation, commonly called the first law of nature.” Self-preservation requires that an individual have the liberty to think, to act, and to keep the products of his thought and action. Before the Enlightenment, these rights, had they been conceived, would have been regarded as sins if not crimes, because they represent and protect the opposite of service to authority, whether king or God. Individual rights enshrine self-assertion, not self-sacrifice; the quest for material wealth, not poverty ennobling the soul; the profit motive, not the heaven motive; independence, not obedience; the pursuit of happiness, not of duty.\textsuperscript{124}

Man’s rights, it was agreed, are inalienable, and their source is not society or government, but Nature. “Natural” here means based on the facts of reality—that is, on laws of Nature discovered by man scientifically; “inalienable” means eternal and immutable—that is, absolutes which no one may properly infringe. In both respects, it was said, there is no difference between these newly discovered laws of politics and the universally revered laws of Newton.

And “to secure these rights Governments are instituted among Men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed.” These powers, therefore, are limited. Government is forbidden to take any action that would infringe individual rights because, in Adams’s words, “the grand end of civil government, from the very nature of its institution, is for the support, protection, and defense of those very rights...” An agent of individuals, in other words, can exercise only the powers they have delegated to it.\textsuperscript{125}

Capitalist theory, consistently interpreted, requires a “wall of separation” between Church and state, just as it does between economy and state. The government may not establish religion or any other ideology; nor may it redistribute wealth or regulate any other aspect of the economy in this system. A church may gain spiritual power over man, and a business economic power, but neither can exercise political power—that is, neither can advance its goals by seeking special government action. The whole apparatus of the absolute state—and implicitly of the modern welfare state—is thus swept away. The government is nothing but a policeman charged with arresting criminals at home and abroad. The state, in Jefferson’s words, is to concern itself only with that which “picks my pocket or breaks my bones.”

Since this view of government, being a corollary of the principle of individual rights, is viewed as an absolute, no segment of the population can properly pervert it—neither a politically established clique of nobility nor the sentiments of a majority, however large. Proper law is not aristocratic or democratic; it is objective, because the right to liberty is based on fact, not on anyone’s arbitrary desire. As Locke puts it, men are “not to be under the will or legislative authority of man, but to have only the law of nature for [their] rule.”\textsuperscript{126}

Europeans at the time believed that a nation with so limited a government could not survive; a strong man was considered necessary to preserve order, by keeping in check the innate sinfulness of human nature. But the founding fathers, being Enlightenment believers in progress, rejected the idea of original sin. Since each individual possesses the powerful faculty of reason, they held, each has the ability to know reality, to pursue rational goals, and to grasp the importance of being self-made and self-sustaining; so the individual does not need brutality to keep him peaceful, but only freedom. If virtue did require the grasp of an ineffable supernatural, as Platonism held, then morality would be impossible to the worldly masses; but if Platonism is wrong, as this period thought, then a people’s virtue requires only their exercise of their worldly minds to achieve worldly goals. In this system, seeing is not at war with believing, and everyone can deal with a world he can see.\textsuperscript{127}

Secularism, though most widespread in America, was a defining attribute of the Enlightenment throughout the West. Everywhere thinkers in this brief era praised science, while rejecting the demand for faith, making fun of dogma, and heaping contempt on organized religion, especially Christianity. Nor, especially in the New World, was this merely a trend among intellectuals. Only one in fifteen of the Colonial population were churchgoers, and Christians here were often fearful for the very survival of their faith. Mankind, observed Reverend Charles Backus, is in “great danger of being laughed out of religion...”\textsuperscript{128}

It was in this philosophic atmosphere that the capitalist system of government was born. Their revolutionary documents, the founders stressed,
were secular declarations, and they were castigated for this by their opponents, who regarded the independence movement as an un-Christian evil. During the Constitutional Convention, William Williams of Connecticut moved to enlarge the Preamble to include language that today would be considered uncontroversial rhetoric; he wanted some mention of the country's belief in "the one living and true God... His universal providence and the authority of His laws...." The motion was voted down. In the same year, the Senate ratified unanimously a treaty that included the statement that the U.S. government "is not in any sense founded on the Christian religion...." Again in that year, when someone asked Hamilton why there was no reference to God in the Constitution, he answered cheerfully: "We forgot."

A stranger wrote to me recently to see whether I agreed with him about the philosophy of capitalism. I cannot recall his name, but I cannot forget his best sentences: "Capitalism is not God's way for fallen man. It is man's way for fallen God."

Like Aristotle, the thinkers of the Enlightenment were not atheists. Mostly they were deists, who believed in God but cut His connection to life on earth. In this view God has a plan, but it is irrelevant to us, since we receive no communication from Him. The supernatural, they conceded, created Nature and its immutable laws, including man's rights and the laws of politics, but these rights and laws are discovered by our unaided reason and—since they are immutable—not even God can change them.

For the medieval popes and even to a great extent for Louis XIV, we might say, God writes, casts, directs, and judges the political show, continually demanding changes from the wings. For the founding fathers, God builds the theater and its personnel, then takes off, leaving man alone to write the scripts and stage the production. A god so silent and powerless (in these ways, just like Aristotle's) is not a factor in human life, but merely a fading echo of an earlier age. He is no more relevant to capitalist politics than to Newtonian mechanics. In Jefferson's words, "our civil rights have no dependence on our religious opinions, any more than our opinions in physics or geometry." The Enlightenment's references "to God or a divine being seem purely perfunctory," sums up J. M.

Kelly, fellow of Trinity College, Oxford; "reason is in the foreground, the Divinity or the Creator hardly more than a decorous adjunct...."

In applying its secularism to epistemology, the Enlightenment generally followed Locke—not Locke the nominalist and budding skeptic, but Locke the empiricist, who had followed Aristotle in rejecting any claim to a priori ideas. Knowledge, thinkers held at the time, rests on experience. On this basis, men can then abstract, generalize, deduce—that is, they can conceptualize their observations, and thereby discover truth with certainty.

Secularism without skepticism—this was the essence of the Enlightenment philosophy, as it had been for its progenitor, Aristotle. As to rationalism with its claim to intuitive insight, the period tended to agree with Locke's barb that it is easy "to be sure without proofs, and to know without perceiving"; men turned their backs here on a priori deductions in order to grasp actual fact—by experience. Jefferson, for example, urged the young to study history on the grounds that it would give them "the experience of other times and other nations..."; only this kind of knowledge, he believed, enables us to know the nature of man and the causes of happiness. More important here, Jefferson presents the Declaration of Independence not as an expression of a priori insight or pure thought, but rather as knowledge that "all experience hath shewn." "Experience," write Madison and Hamilton, "is the oracle of truth; and where its responses are unequivocal, they ought to be conclusive and sacred."

All the key features of the capitalist state—its validation, its powers and limits, the prerogatives and interrelationships of its citizens—are unified, because all are derived from a single principle: the worldly self-preservation of the individual. In this view, the state is a form of connection among the Many—a connection made by the Many, and real only through their agreement. Here we see not a One transcending the Many, but a One in the Many. Or, putting Thales into Latin, e pluribus unum—the I formula.

Pluralism (in Government)

During the second half of the nineteenth century, the intellectuals of the West increasingly rejected capitalism. A new political approach had taken
hold in Europe by the 1880s, starting in Germany under Bismarck; a generation later, the Progressive Party brought it to the United States. Following many political scientists, I call this approach pluralism, although in different contexts it has two better-known names: the mixed economy and the welfare state. The exponents of this viewpoint have included a wide diversity of influential thinkers; in America alone, they were prominent among Social Gospelers, utilitarians, Keynesians, and pragmatists, to say nothing of the fact that the viewpoint has been endorsed by every president since Theodore Roosevelt and Woodrow Wilson through the two Bushes.

The pluralist in politics denies that government has any single purpose, such as carrying out God’s will or protecting man’s rights. There are many proper governmental goals, he holds, and these are not connected by or deducible from any abstract formula. Under the right circumstances, a proper government may and or should, among other things, prevent monopoly and unfair competition; ensure full employment, obscenity-free TV, and safe drugs; protect civil rights; prohibit insider trading and racial discrimination; protect free speech and a free press; prohibit abortion and prayer in the schools; conscript the young; nationalize health care; protect the citizen from unwarranted intrusion by the government; redistribute wealth; and safeguard patents and copyrights.

By its nature, pluralism does not prioritize these functions. In its commonest, democratic form, it leaves the evaluation of any particular program to the people (at least, that is the theory). As in pluralist education, so too for these empiricists; they do not claim people’s desires to be objectively valid—that is, to be based on an external reality, whether Nature or God. On the contrary, desires are taken as proper guides to action simply because they exist, and that is all we have to go by. Hence, in the words of William James, “So far as [a man] feels anything to be good, he makes it good.”

The pluralist state is not frozen in the capitalist role of watchman, forbidden by “inalienable rights” to expand. Since the concept of rights, natural or divine, has no basis in experience, Comte wrote, the term in its Enlightenment sense is “metaphysical.” Rights properly understood derive from that which alone in this context is observable: society. As American journalist Walter Lippmann put it, rights are “creations of the law, and have no other validity except as they are ordained by law.” Laws, of course, can be changed when people want them to change.

Although most of these anti-capitalist pluralists have endorsed an ever-increasing growth of government, they deny that they seek to establish an omnipotent state. Over a century ago, Washington Gladden, congregational minister and crusading Social Gospeler, gave the position one of its clearest statements. Although he himself was working to bring about bigger government, he wrote, he did not wish the state “to be turned into a good fairy” who would “empty the horn of plenty at every man’s door...” The pro-capitalist, he went on, would have government fill none of man’s wants (aside from police protection). The socialist would have it fill all of them. By definition, however, the pluralist shuns “none” and “all”; rather, Gladden says, the government should fill “many of [people’s] wants and provide for many of their necessities...” To a pluralist, the Many here as elsewhere are not linked by necessary interconnection.

One of the great virtues of pluralist government, say its defenders, is its ability to adopt the good features of capitalism and of socialism, while avoiding the evils caused in each by its monistic inflexibility. The pluralist society can combine individual freedom with caring government; property rights with redistribution of wealth; the citizen’s independence with his interdependence. Gladden sums up: pluralism, he says, can combine “liberty and love.” When the exponents of capitalism or socialism criticize these combinations as self-contradictory, pluralists reply that they reject the extremism of the monists in favor of moderation, balance, or centrism.

When the monists ask for the ideology validating their moderation, pluralists reply that the question brings out another virtue of their approach: It needs no ideology to validate it, it depends on no system, it cannot be defined or implemented by reference to sweeping generalities.

This feature of pluralism, its exponents say, is what enables its government to deal with the real issues of political life. Life is concrete, so the proper political agenda is a compilation of concretes, of specific, changing answers to specific, changing problems, each of which must be dealt
with not by reference to some overarching conceptual scheme, but singly, empirically, and piecemeal.

Colonel Gian Gentile of West Point once illustrated this approach in regard to foreign policy, in a statement pointing out (I think favorably) that American forces in Iraq were deliberately pursuing measures chosen on an ad hoc basis without an overall objective. In a memorable phrase, he calls this approach a “strategy of tactics.”

Those who uphold the old-fashioned approach, Dewey says, agreeing here with the pluralists, cannot give us practical guidance. Capitalists and socialists, for example,

suffer from a common defect. They are all committed to the logic of general notions under which specific situations are to be brought. . . . [Their theories] are ready-made principles to be imposed upon particulars in order to determine their nature. They tell us about the state when we want to know about some state.

Here again we see the concrete-boundedness of pluralists—but here again we can also see their moderation. Within limits, pluralists in politics often do seek out empirical generalizations and causal connections, the knowledge of which they typically do regard as an important or at least relevant factor in resolving policy disputes. The generalizations they reach, however—sought out as they are to deal piecemeal with unconnected problems—are much narrower in scope than those of their intellectual predecessors, and are of course avowedly not absolutes. “[N]o particular set of tenets,” writes Edwin Seligman, a Columbia economist, “can arrogate to itself the claim of immutable truth, or the assumption of universal applicability to all countries or epochs.”

Since political pluralism is a mixed mode, there are substantial differences among its exponents. In content, there is a wide range of opposed views in regard to how, when, and whether a given government should grow. Although all these men reject capitalism and socialism, there are still many significant incompatibilities between, say, FDR and Ronald Reagan, or in general between liberals and conservatives.

Epistemologically—leaving aside Christian fundamentalists, who are not pluralists—there are the pluralists’ many differences in regard to the value and scope of principles as practical political guides. Some believe that the American founding principles, even if not absolute, are the best we have, but that now they must be restated in less sweeping a form to accommodate the unique conditions of modern life. Others attach more weight to such conditions, and interpret the founders’ philosophy as a set of important but more or less toothless generalities—still useful, but only when converted into volumes of more specific generalizations. These differences reflect differences in tilt within the mixed mode. The more pro-capitalist side tilts to the Aristotelian politics of the Enlightenment along with its view of concepts. The more anti-capitalist and anti-conceptual side tilts to the new master of the times, Kant. Despite their often fierce contention, however, they all uphold the same political mixture; they all practice the same mode.

Modern pluralists in politics are skeptics in regard to basic principles, but knowers in regard to lower-level generalizations. They advocate the Many interspersed by unconnected Ones—the formula of D. This is one reason why the Republicans and the Democrats, despite their rhetoric, so often seem indistinguishable.

Totalitarianism

Both Communists and Fascists describe themselves as socialists, since unlimited power over the economy entails unlimited power over everything, and vice versa. Socialism, however, is a narrow term, referring primarily to economics. The broader term, which covers the state’s power over everything, is totalitarianism. More than any others, the philosophers who directly generated this type of state in both its modern forms were Hegel and Marx. For reasons already given, I focus here on Communism.

As the name “totalitarianism” (coined by Mussolini) implies, the powers of the proper state are unlimited. The leadership can tolerate no dissent, whether based on religion, morality, or any other entity once
regarded as independent of government. The state is to control not only art and education, as we've seen, but every detail of a man's life; the only prerogative of the citizen is obedience. As to personal liberty, private ownership, inalienable rights—all these are remnants of a decadent past, which must be obliterated. “The only person who is still a private individual in Germany,” declared Robert Ley, a member of the Nazi hierarchy, “is somebody who is asleep.” As we saw earlier, the beneficiary of such a state and the mover of history is the (chosen) collective, which is the only human reality. The individual exotiled in the past is but a myth; it is wrong, writes Marx, to “postulate an abstract—isolated—human individual. . . . My own existence is a social activity.”

Mankind has matured across centuries, according to Communists, through the interaction of economic classes. A society’s material forces of production, it is said, inevitably come into conflict with the property relations it has established, a conflict that leads to class struggle until the exploiting class is overthrown and a new economic order established. In time, however, the new system spawns a new version of the same basic conflict, which leads to a new form of class struggle and resolution, which is then followed by another such cycle and then another. Every social system thus contains the seeds of its own destruction, and history in essence is no more than the record of these economic rises and falls.

So economic forces determine everything about human life. All the other alleged causes of human behavior—such as ideas, free will, morals, law, religion, and philosophy—are mere “superstructure”; they are historically impotent rationalizations usually designed by the exploiters to protect their own class interests. “It is not the consciousness of men that determines their existence,” writes Marx, “but, on the contrary, their social existence determines their consciousness.”

The reason that history is a continual progression of struggles, the Marxists hold, lies in the basic law of reality: the dialectic process, a concept originated by Hegel and taken up by Marx. In this view (touched on in chapter two), reality by its nature unfolds itself in a succession of triads: one entity (the thesis, A) necessarily generates its contradictory (the antithesis, non-A); then the two are united in a synthesis, which is an identity of opposites (A and non-A). But this fuller synthesis entails a higher thesis that generates a higher antithesis, etc. First off, therefore, Aristotle’s logic must be wrong; the true law of reality is the opposite of the Law of Non-Contradiction. “In its proper meaning,” Lenin observed, “dialectics is the study of the contradiction within the very essence of things.” Although Marx accepted Hegel’s dialectic theory with its embrace of contradictions, he rejected Hegel’s idealistic interpretation of it (as a progression of ideas); in fact, Marx held, the dialectic process entails materialism, the opposite of idealism, because the dialectic’s elements are not ideas, but material (economic) factors.

In Hegel’s view, the dialectic flow is a process of reality’s maturation, which ultimately reaches its final stage in complete and perfect self-development; at this point the progression of contradictions ceases. The Marxists follow Hegel here as well, again in economic terms. History, they agree, is teleological; it has always been moving toward a final and perfect conclusion. In the Communist interpretation, history reaches this climax in two steps: the preparation and the culmination; or the dictatorship of the proletariat followed by the classless society; or, as the Communists liked to put it, socialism and then Communism.

During the first of these, the state must have total power, so that it can eradicate every trace of the pre-Communist mentality. Even the proletariat, Lenin found, were seriously infected ideologically and needed re-education. Thus arose the need for a political party of ideologically sound teachers who would be, in Lenin’s words, the “vanguard of the revolutionary forces in our time.” Since by the nature of its role the vanguard is the necessary expression of reality’s self-development, since it is reality at this stage of history, it follows that the decrees of the party are infallible. The decrees of the party are too well-known to need rehearsal. The main enemies, it was held, were not intellectual dissidents, although they too must be eliminated, but the bourgeois exploiters, however powerless they may seem at present.

When it arrives, the final stage, the classless society, will be the first truly moral society in history, according to the Communist Manifesto; the reason is that nothing then will be left of “naked self-interest,” “egotistical calculation,” or “callous ‘cash payment.’” Instead, the ruling principle will be: “From each according to his ability, to each according to his
need.” These moral values, Marx observed, are “as old as the Judeo-
Christian tradition. But their acceptance for social organization—
their social realization—would be new. . . .” In other words, the difference in
moral values between Christianity and Communism is that the Com-
munists intend really to live by the principles that the Christians merely
preach.\textsuperscript{142}

Once these principles have been internalized by the citizens, Marx
concludes, all will want nothing but to serve the group. So there will be
no further need for a coercive state and the whole apparatus of total-
titarianism will “wither away.” Lenin regarded the details of this withering-
away—when, where, how—as unknowable. Nikita Khrushchev did have
one idea about it; the period of time required to reach the classless society,
he said, “will be a very long one.”\textsuperscript{143}

As avowed materialists and empiricists, the Marxists held that they
could validate their system, including its Hegelian base, scientifically,
through observation; \textit{a priori} ideas, they said, are merely unscientific
vaporings. It would, however, be a daunting task to prove any rationalist’s
theories by empirical means, let alone the theories of Hegel—and there is
little evidence that the Marxists even attempted to do so.

One sympathetic writer, Louis Dupré, illustrates this point in regard
to the principle of dialectic progression.

In Marx’s view the dialectical principle is much more than
an empirical description of the relations between man and his
world. It has an essentially \textit{ideal} character. . . . It is precisely
this ideal, rational character which gives the dialectical prin-
ciple a quality of necessity which a purely empirical descrip-
tion always lacks. A mere empirical study of facts can provide
a hypothesis, or at most a theory, but it can never predict with
the absolute confidence which gives Marxism all its power and
influence.\textsuperscript{144}

Again, in regard to the notion of teleology—that is, of reality moving
purposefully toward motionless perfection, with its corollary that what-
ever is, is right—Hegel tried to validate this idea and the conservatism it
implies apart from observation, by means of his own rationalist frame-
work. To my knowledge, no revolutionists of any stripe have claimed to
validate it on the basis of observation. Indeed, Marxists themselves have
always found and decreed a great many evils in “whatever is.”

Sabine questions the empirical base of still another Marxist essential:
the seemingly straightforward division of bourgeois society into two eco-
nomic groups, capitalists and workingmen. What about farmers, he asks,
and independent artisans, the professions, white-collar workers, and oth-
ers? Marx, he says, “merely lumped” all these forms of production into a
miscellaneous “petty bourgeoisie,” which was then written off as historically
insignificant. “No empirical sociology,” Sabine concludes, “would count
independent artisans and office workers as having the same type of work
experience.” For Marx, however, a society with only two contenders
is a deductive necessity mandated by his dialectic theory, which requires
social thesis and antithesis.\textsuperscript{145}

The above is merely a sample of Marx’s non-empiricism, which the
interested reader must investigate on his own; in my judgment, the sam-
ple is representative. The fundamental principles of the Communists, I
conclude, are not based on observation; they are accepted as \textit{a priori}
truth. This applies not only to the admitted Hegelianism in their meta-
physics, but to their materialist interpretation of it as well. An idea is \textit{a priori}
not through content, but through method; it is \textit{a priori} if its valida-
tion is independent of experience, whatever its subject, including matter
and economics. Marxists do cite observations as a starting point in justi-
fying their theories, including their materialism and economic determini-
ism, but few rationalists from Plato on have done differently. What makes
a thinker, a rationalist is what he does after the starting point. What he
does is turn away from observation in order to uphold a discovery inac-
cessible to experience or to scientific inference from it. This, it seems
clear, was the procedure of the Marxists when they jumped from an
ideology-driven analysis of a handful of past societies to the all-embracing
metaphysical principles of materialism and economic determinism.\textsuperscript{146}

A realm known by percepts and another known by concepts—the sens-
sible world and the world of ideas—is this the Platonism of the Marxist
metaphysics. It is unmixed Platonism, since in Marx’s view (as in Hegel’s),
the ideal world is the true, unified, immutable reality, as against its transient worldly stages, which are all that has ever been available to our experience. As in Hegel, these stages may not be regarded as reality, because each is only a partial and fleeting manifestation, soon to be contradicted and vanish into the next.

Conceptual reality versus deceptive appearance is, of course, not the formula of materialism, but of its opposite, as Sabine points out. Marx’s claim to be a materialist, he writes, “in no way displaced the Hegelian assumption of an underlying force which is the hidden reality behind a multiplicity of more or less ephemeral manifestations and appearances.” A succinct elaboration of this point—by Sir Karl Popper, British philosopher of science—is deservedly famous. Marx, he writes,

replaced Hegel’s “Spirit” by matter, and by material and economic interests. In the same way, racialism substitutes for Hegel’s “Spirit” something material, the quasi-biological conception of Blood or Race. Instead of “Spirit,” Blood is the self-developing essence; instead of “Spirit,” Blood is the Sovereign of the world, and displays itself on the Stage of History; and instead of its “Spirit,” the Blood of a nation determines its essential destiny.

The transubstantiation of Hegelianism into racialism or of Spirit into Blood does not greatly alter the main tendency of Hegelianism. It only gives it a tinge of biology and of modern evolutionism.447

Since percepts, in this view, are mere appearance, a thinker has the right and even the duty, if observations challenge the established a priori, to reinterpret or reject them. This is the philosophic explanation of the totalitarians’ elevation of ideology above fact both in literature and education. According to Sabine, the same elevation applies to science; Marx, for example, gave little weight to Newton’s mechanistic explanations of events, since Marx regarded them “as belonging to a lower form of logic because it deals with a lower stage of reality.” For the same reason, the Party is infallible, because an unreality cannot contradict the vanguard of reality. In this issue, Friedrich Engels’s work is perhaps the most clear; Engels, Sabine writes, “attributed rationality to nature in exactly the Hegelian sense. The real or rational cannot be equated with existence because much of what exists is irrational and therefore unreal; for example, in 1789 the French monarchy existed but was not real.”448

The equivalent of such an utterance would have been possible for the medievals, but not for the earlier modern mind. In the twentieth century, however, it became possible again.

In totalitarian thought, there is no longer a philosophic justification for a division of political power, such as between Church and king. The one true reality is grasped by the one unified party in the form of a unified system of ideas—a system that elevates the collective, and regards the individual and ultimately all worldly entities as unreal appearance. So: the One without the Many—\(M_1\).

**Egalitarianism**

In the decades after World War II, a new approach became increasingly evident on the ethical-political scene: egalitarianism, which for the first time has made explicit an idea long implicit in Western thought, notably in the teachings of Christianity, Kant, and Marx. The non-academic representatives of this viewpoint are usually concerned not so much with theory as with its application to some delimited area. But the pioneering source of this movement in our time is an academic: Harvard philosopher John Rawls.

Egalitarianism is the view that equality is the fundamental moral value and, therefore, the standard of good and evil. Equality here does not refer to equality before the law; although this principle, introduced by capitalism, is endorsed by most of these thinkers, they regard it as merely a minor instance of morality. Nor does equality mean equality of opportunity, a social condition advocated since FDR by welfare statisticians, who argued that society should equip all men equally from the start with the knowledge and goods necessary to achieve success in life, but thereafter should leave men reasonably free to compete, some ending up
winners and others losers. To this viewpoint, egalitarians reply that, owing to factors beyond their control, some men are doomed to fail no matter what society does. If the fundamental moral value is to be achieved, they conclude, society must concern itself primarily not with the start of a man’s endeavors, but with the end. The moral principle is not equality of opportunity, but equality of result.

Egalitarians differ, at least linguistically, in their interpretation of equality, but not on its essence. In regard to any value of significance, all agree, every man is equally entitled to have it. It is immoral, therefore, for men to compete with one another, each attempting to gain for himself or his loved ones an unequal share of the good things of life. Instead, writes Peter Singer, Australian philosopher and an intellectual founder of the animal rights movement, each of us should “go beyond ‘I’ and ‘you’ to ... the standpoint of the impartial spectator.”

The value most often discussed by these theorists is material wealth. If equality is the definition of justice, then any disparity between rich and poor is self-evidently unjust. Egalitarians acknowledge that some men produce material values (and thus gain an income) that are superior, sometimes incomparably so, to those produced by others. Further, contrary to the Marxists, the dominant voices acknowledge that such producers usually succeed through their own character and consequent actions, such as disciplined thought and hard work. But none of this, they say, justifies the conclusion that producers have earned their products or deserve to keep them. The reason is that a man’s intelligence, his character, and all his other productive attributes are a result of luck: his luck in the “lottery of nature,” which gave him his superior brain; and/or his luck in being born and raised in a superior environment, which gave his brain the means to develop.

The actual creator of a product, therefore, is not its so-called producer, but the Nature/society combination that produced him. Since he is moving through life courtesy of factors he did nothing to earn, he cannot claim moral credit for his work, mental or physical, or ownership of it either. To the windfalls of luck, every person has equal claim. Justice does not allow us to reward the lucky or to penalize the unlucky—this last, because unproductive and immoral men, too, are not the authors of their actions. In the ancient world, Theophrastus, a student of Aristotle’s, stated a viewpoint then regarded as obviously true: “It cannot happen that a good man is not angered by evil ... the better each person is, the more irascible he will be.” Not anymore.

In place of the traditional idea of justice as giving every man his due, which implies that some are due more than others, we must implement a new definition of justice—justice as fairness. Fairness here means the elimination of the results of Nature’s unfairness.

Besides inequality of wealth, there are many other sorts of inequality that egalitarians in various areas condemn as unfair and seek to remove. Today’s ethic leaders, who regard opponents of the new fairness as racist, seek not old-fashioned civil rights, already long gained, but equality for their minorities in regard to all the values enjoyed by the majority. Feminists seek equality with males—in income, status, power—through liberation from “sexism.” Age activists, fighting “ageism,” want equality with the young. The physically handicapped, fighting “ableism,” want equality with the healthy. The ugly, fighting “looksism,” want equality with the beautiful. The multiculturalists, fighting “imperialism,” want the West to acknowledge that its culture is no better than any other. The animal-rights activists, fighting “speciesism,” want us to recognize that man is no more important than any other creature.

So any standard or practice that divides men (or creatures in general) into better or worse, winners or losers, must be eliminated—for example, offering merit pay, awarding the Nobel Prize, or holding beauty contests. The only way to eliminate all these injustices, said the egalitarian former director of the Van Cliburn International Piano Competition, is to “stamp out the concept of the better.”

Rawls is concerned that, in practice, bad consequences might flow from his theory, especially from its advocacy of the redistribution of wealth. He argues, therefore, that some inequalities are justified—but only if and to the extent that they benefit the unluckiest men, the “most disadvantaged” members of society. In other passages, however, Rawls emphasizes his conviction that consequences of any kind are not relevant to ethics, which is not a recipe for achieving goals, such as men’s happiness or the welfare of the poor. On the contrary, he says, ethics is an
 injunction to obey unconditionally one law: the moral law itself, the principle of equality. This inconsistency of Rawls has been deplored by the movement; the moral man’s concern, many pointed out, is not quality of life, but equality. One cannot, therefore, place standard of living or any other consideration above it. To the moralist, they now agree, practical results do not matter.

Egalitarians acknowledge that, as a matter of fact and in virtually every respect, men are unequal. But their theory holds that in order to be just we must not only ignore this fact, but reverse it—that is, we must act (including redistribute values) as though its opposite were true. Men are not equal in reality, granted, but they are equal in our moral theory. These moralists do not claim to be working for the eradication of human differences; to make all men equally intelligent, honest, attractive, etc., is a task they spurn as utopian. Rather, they want us to make moral choices as if the differences had been eradicated.

Rawls, the most philosophical of them, explains why. Men’s differences, he says, though real, are not morally relevant; we can reach a man’s moral essence only by imagining him stripped of his attributes, because all of these are but effects of his unearned (and thus non-moral) natural/social endowment. The moral man, in other words, is what is left after the man we see has been stripped of his brain, body, knowledge, memory, character traits, desires, skills, etc. From this perspective, Rawls concludes, all men are the same. If men were placed under what he calls a veil of ignorance, so that each were ignorant of any attributes distinguishing himself or anyone from anyone else—that is, if each became in thought his pure self, stripped of all non-moral features—then, having no basis any longer to judge any man, himself included, as more deserving of anything than any other man, he would have to choose egalitarianism as his moral viewpoint.

A moral claim, in this theory, is one made by an attribute-less man—which means: by a man who is nothing in particular, by an existent without identity, i.e., by nothing. Men are equally deserving not because of what they think, feel, or do, but because at the core they are equally zero. Kant, as we have seen, was the first philosopher to elevate nothing above something; in his ethics, nihilism took the form of his theory that each man has an unknowable, noumenal self—and that this is the authority demanding unlimited sacrifice by his worldly self. Rawls’s approach is a variant of this: Egalitarianism is to be obeyed because it is demanded of phenomenal man by his real self—that is, by his unknowable, identityless negation. His own theory of justice, Rawls notes, “is highly Kantian in nature. Indeed, I must disclaim any originality for the views I have put forward.”

Since Kant’s ideas cannot be defended by empirical means, as he himself insisted, and since most egalitarians, as empiricists, reject his noumenal world and his quasi-rationalist embrace of the a priori, the majority, unlike Rawls, simply brush aside the issue of validating their viewpoint. If asked why equality is desirable, writes Kai Nielson, a Canadian philosophy professor and an egalitarian,

it is difficult to know what to say. . . . Reason . . . is not sufficient to provide an answer. . . . I do not know how anyone could show [egalitarianism] to be true . . . or in any way prove it or show that if one is through and through rational, one must accept it.

The egalitarian principle, such philosophers seem to suggest, has no objective basis; it is justified neither inductively, as a means to an end, nor deductively, as an inference from intuitive self-evidences.

An ethics thus detached from perception and conception alike offers little guidance in regard to selecting a specific course of action. Since all demands for equality are by definition meritorious regardless of merit, and since consequences are irrelevant, some interpreters say that inequalities anywhere should be fought against equally. But some inequalities are more egregious, say others, and thus more deserving of society’s immediate concern.

Few egalitarians attempt to resolve such disagreements. Since they cannot prioritize inequalities by reference to a theory—that is, to conceptual thought—most dismiss these questions as pointless abstraction. People, they say, know what they want, so no hierarchy of importance is required. The moral man needs no intellectual system to guide him. He
starts anywhere, singling out for crusade the specific injustice about which he feels strongly; he is moved by emotionally charged concretes in the here and now. His eyes are not on a vision of an ideal human future, but on a perceptual-level flux of social sores—inequality of health insurance, of gender pay, of wheelchair access, et al—sores to be picked up piecemeal, fought against, and, if the emotional charge runs down, dropped piecemeal. Here again we see, but more consistently than in the D case, the method of strategy through tactics.134

Whatever the injustice egalitarians strive to eliminate, their method of dealing with it does not vary. Since the unlucky losers, the bottoms among men, are by definition helpless, they can gain the values equality requires only if the tops are cut down—that is, only if they are deprived not merely of their greater money, but also of their unequal share of respect, admiration, rights, and power. These values, too, must be—and are now being—redistributed.

In the affirmative action programs, jobs and college admissions are awarded regularly to unqualified applicants at the price of being denied to the qualified. In many schools, grading students and even scorekeeping in games are being dropped, so that the superior performers, being unidentified, do not enjoy admiration for their feats, while the inferior ones gain self-esteem, since they are free now not to know that their betters are better. On many elite campuses, the civil rights of boys charged with rape are being redistributed: To bring equality to women, seen as victims of male aggression, the presumption in trials now is not the innocence of the accused, but the probable truth of the accusation—especially, at Stanford, if the accused acts “persuasive and logical.” On the handicapped-lib front, one group a few years back, during Christopher Reeve’s fight to regain normal functioning after his tragic accident, denounced his fight as hurtful elitism, since it implied that a normal man is superior to a paraplegic.155

Big business is increasingly told that community or environmentalist activists, though without capital or business experience, should have a seat on the board or at least a real voice in corporate management, so that today’s unfair distribution of power can be replaced with equality of decision making. In our foreign policy, we see the United States, though on

the verge of bankruptcy, lavishly (and sometimes apologetically) redistributing its wealth and often even its soldiers to dozens of relatively primitive cultures, including some that embrace murderous enemies of this country. We do it now not on biblical grounds, but mostly because it is politically correct: There are no enemies, there are no better or worse cultures, only some unlucky losers, who for that very reason have a right to share in the fruits of the lucky ones, such as the West.

The ambition of the egalitarian theory is all-encompassing; its target is not merely art, science, and education, but values as such, in any realm. Those who succeed in the pursuit of a value are to see the products of their action, spiritual and material, “spread around” to the non-succeeders, because they are non-succeeders. Value achievement leads a man to loss; non-achievement leads him to gain.

Peter Singer sums up the point memorably. It is essential, he writes, that we bring down the “high flyers.”

Bringing them down, egalitarians concede, may cause suffering among men, even among the losers at the bottom, since, by the theory’s own statement, they can survive only through the work of the “flyers.” Nevertheless, consequences are irrelevant to morality. “[J]ustice,” writes Marshall Cohen, professor of philosophy at Columbia, “requires the elimination of . . . inequalities, even if their elimination inhibits a further raising of the minimum.” By the same reasoning such elimination is required even if it plunges men down to disaster level. The acclaimed humanitarian Albert Schweitzer, avant-garde in this issue, confessed the dilemma that often tortured him as a doctor: Since both are equal, should he save the man and kill the virus, or vice versa?156

The dictator of Cambodia, Pol Pot, an eclectic mix of Communism and egalitarianism, had no hesitation in mandating the result implicit in the ideal he had learned from the French: “After the first year of Khmer Rouge rule, to take just one example, foraging for food was denounced as a manifestation of individualism. Some might wind up with more than others. Better that all should starve equally.”157

There is only one name for a theory that starts with a zero in man’s soul and uses it to create a zero out of mankind: nihilism.

Although I have now given the same level of detail to egalitarianism
as to its predecessors, I cannot ignore one more variant of the theory, because this one is the most consistent to date, and by far the most influential in our culture. Since the instances of a mode often come and go with ease, this particular instance is not necessarily here to stay; nevertheless it does make the nature of egalitarianism even clearer than the other variants do, and thus provides a unique key to understanding today's intellectual establishment.

Since moral respect is merited by existence apart from identity, this movement holds, there is no reason to deny such respect to inanimate Nature; since it exists, it has the same moral status as man, and must be treated accordingly. So the social redistribution of wealth discussed earlier is not true egalitarianism, as it turns out, because wealth is created by our species' assault on this moral equal. In the act of production, men necessarily violate the rights of Nature; they gain their survival and standard of living by molesting rivers with dams, tearing open the earth and looting it of its coal and oil, driving whole species into homelessness or extinction in order to build shopping malls; etc. To abolish these immoralities, writes Roger S. Gottlieb—a philosophy professor at Worcester—we must stop hoping "for a continually better life for ourselves and our children, defining 'better' as 'richer, bigger, faster, more.'" The moral alternative is a life that is poorer, smaller, slower, less. To achieve this, consumers must come to understand the evil of "all those long drives, all those appliances, all that stuff we've bought . . . . What kinds of lives are we living if we continue to shop, drive our cars, fly ozone-destroying jets . . . ?" The fact that "all that stuff" may contribute to men's happiness is morally irrelevant. The moral standard is not happiness, but fairness, and by that standard, people must learn not to accumulate, but to give up their enjoyments.138

Since man is but a fragment of Nature, these egalitarians contend, rights are not possessed only by humans; the environment, too, has rights. "Distinguishing between ourselves and nature," says one, "reflects a self-centered arrogance." It is wrong, therefore, to be "interested in the utility of a particular species, or free-flowing river, or ecosystem to mankind." In this view, man must give up not merely "excessive" wealth or the use of "dwindling resources," not merely jet planes and oil, but all material products, everything acquired by interfering with natural entities and thereby violating their rights. If men do not comply with this obligation, they are moral monsters and a threat to the planet.

Specific political measures to achieve the environmentalist agenda are often presented to the public as a practical means of averting some catastrophe to human life. Since the desirability of such catastrophe is inherent in the theory, however, the appeal to practicality is disingenuous—a fact further evidenced by the parade of ever-changing and often mutually contradictory disasters predicted by the movement. (In one recent series of weather-centered menaces, "nuclear winter" gave way to "global warming," which seems to be giving way to an undefined yet ominous "climate change.") The predictors of all these disasters claim the support of science, in part through the use of skewed and ever-changing computer models; in part by excluding from academic outlets the many scientists whose research contradicts their claims; and in part, as the newspapers have recently revealed, through shocking fraud at the top of the climatologist hierarchy in England. It seems obvious that the environmentalists, like the Marxists and many other groups, invoke science selectively, when it seems useful to their cause.

The enemy that makes man's rape of Nature possible on today's scale, the most philosophical among the environmentalists hold, is the industrial revolution. The movement's efforts to eliminate this enemy are concretized and analyzed in Ayn Rand's Return of the Primitive, especially in the chapter entitled "The Anti-Industrial Revolution."

One example of the environmentalists' animus here is the establishment's policy in regard to energy: its campaign to slow up or shut down every form of energy (unless it is green and useless), including coal, oil, nuclear, natural gas, and even the dams of hydroelectricity. This campaign reflects a commitment to choke off the lifeblood of an industrial society. Three main methods are being employed to achieve this goal: cutting the consumption of energy, cutting its production, and changing people's psychology.

The first is stated by Paul Ehrlich, a pioneer in the movement writing years ago, who explained, "Giving society cheap, abundant energy at this point would be the moral equivalent of giving an idiot child a machine
The second method, usually presented in gradual, unscary form, is illustrated by one of the current administration’s non-controversial ideas, here described by Bret Stephens, an editor and columnist at the Wall Street Journal. President Obama, he writes, “wants to cut U.S. greenhouse gas emissions by 83% from current levels by 2050, levels not seen since the 1870s—in effect, the Industrial Revolution in reverse.”

The third method aims to teach an individual to consider his personal life not from a selfish but from a conservationist point of view. A nice, if untypically extreme, example here was provided by the Web site of the Australian Broadcasting Corporation in a “fun” program aimed at a young audience: Children are invited to click on an icon of a skull and crossbones in order to “find out at what age you should die so you don’t use more than your fair share of Earth’s resources!” A seven-year-old girl named Suzie discovered that she deserved to die years ago because she had already used up her “fair share.”

As there should be no trespassing on a neighbor’s property, the environmentalists sum up, so there should be no trace of man’s existence in the world of Nature, no “environmental footprints.” A patient way of removing these footprints was reported decades ago by Newsweek magazine: “...a number of today’s environmental reformers conclude that mankind’s main hope lies not in technology but in abstinence—fewer births and less gadgetry.” For those impatient to cleanse the globe now, biologist David Graber has an idea:

Human happiness, and certainly fecundity are not as important as a wild and healthy planet...it is cosmically unlikely that the developed world will choose to end its orgy of fossil-energy consumption, and the Third World its suicidal consumption of landscape. Until such time as Homo sapiens should decide to rejoin nature, some of us can only hope for the right virus to come along.

It is mass death being welcomed here, for its own sake, with no war or shortages or social needs to justify it. Even though a minority of egalitarians are conservatives, those influential in politics stress the need for government action to achieve equality. As history has shown, they say, human beings left alone will always treat one another and/or Nature unequally. Only a state with the power of coercion can reverse this evil, and in performing this moral task there can be no limitation on its power. But, the egalitarians go on, they do not advocate a totalitarian state. If liberty is taken to be the inalienable right to ownership and action regardless of the effects on equality, then of course liberty will be abolished by their government. But, they say, freedom of a different kind, as a matter of degree, is compatible with the egalitarian state—freedom in the form and amount society deems proper at a given time; of this kind of freedom by definition everyone will enjoy an equal amount.

The precursors of today’s egalitarians preached equality in theory, but always postponed its practice. For example, the medieval Christians and the modern Communists, each in their own fashion, held out as their goal and result the final triumph of the deserving and the banishing of the wicked. In this cause, they righteously rewarded their supporters and punished their enemies; they elevated those who knew the truth and cast down those who did not. In short, they were staunch defenders of moral and epistemological inequality—a fact expressed in the political hierarchies prominent in both movements. Both did champion the value of equality. But the Christians preached it as an ideal realizable only in the next life, and the Marxists as an ideal realizable only in the ever-receding final stage of Communism. Each group understood that the end of the “better” would mean the end of their movement.

The egalitarians have a different viewpoint. They want equality now, with all the zeros that entails. It has been said that the greens are Communism reborn, merely a name change for the reds. But this is not true. The egalitarian movement rejects certain of the fundamentals of the Communist mind. It does not work for or promise a better life for a better man—but rather no life for any of us.

The true color of the environmentalist movement is not red or green, but black.

In the nineteenth century, men entered the race of life at different starting points, according to whatever assets they were given or
had created; fairness, it was held, is men's equal freedom to run. In the
twentieth century, we heard that the race is fair only if everyone, through
government aid, starts at the same point. Now, in the twenty-first cen-
tury, we hear that, to be fair, the men leading the race must have their legs
broken so that the losers can catch up.

As the archetype of the anti-integration mentality in social-political
issues, egalitarianism clearly upholds the Many without the One—the
formula of $D_2$. 
# Western History in DIM Terms

(one or two word reminders of key topics covered)

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